Reactive Devaluation

In one study, a proposed arms reduction plan was rated more favorably when attributed to a neutral party than when attributed to the Soviet Union — by American participants. The content was identical; the source changed the judgment. We automatically devalue concessions from adversaries. If they’re offering it, it must benefit them more than us. The very fact of their proposal becomes evidence against it.

Lee Ross called this reactive devaluation. It’s not strategic skepticism about an opponent’s motives — it’s automatic discounting triggered by the source, prior to any analysis of content. The same deal that seems fair from a neutral party seems like a trap from an enemy. The proposal’s value is contaminated by who proposed it.

The dynamic poisons negotiation. Every concession an adversary makes is devalued upon receipt. Their compromise looks like a ploy; their olive branch looks suspicious. Meanwhile, your own concessions seem generous — and you expect credit that won’t come, because the other side is reactively devaluing too. Both sides feel they’re giving more than they’re getting.

This explains why third-party mediators help. A proposal routed through a neutral party arrives without the contaminating source. The same terms become acceptable when they don’t feel like enemy surrender demands. The content hasn’t changed; the psychological packaging has.

Awareness doesn’t automatically cure the bias. Knowing about reactive devaluation doesn’t make enemy proposals feel more trustworthy. But it can prompt the question: “Would I accept this offer from someone I trusted?” Separating the proposal from the proposer, evaluating the terms on their own merits — this takes effort but can break the automatic devaluation.

The flip side: if you’re making a proposal to someone who sees you as adversarial, consider how the source will contaminate the message. Sometimes the best strategy is to let someone else propose what you want.