Anchoring
Ask people to estimate the percentage of African nations in the UN. First, spin a wheel of fortune that lands on a number. Then ask your question. People whose wheel showed 10 estimated around 25%. People whose wheel showed 65 estimated around 45%. The wheel was obviously random — yet its arbitrary number influenced judgment. This is anchoring: initial values pull subsequent estimates toward them, even when the anchor is irrelevant.
Tversky and Kahneman demonstrated this across domains. Real estate agents appraised homes differently depending on asking price. Judges sentenced differently depending on prosecution’s demand. Negotiators settled near the first number on the table. The anchor sets a reference point; adjustment from that point is typically insufficient.
The mechanism seems to involve accessibility. The anchor makes certain information salient. Adjustments happen, but they’re effortful and tend to stop too early. People generate reasons supporting the anchor before generating reasons opposing it. The anchor asymmetrically shapes the considerations that follow.
Anchoring is robust against expertise and awareness. Professionals fall for irrelevant anchors in their own domains. Knowing about anchoring doesn’t fully protect against it. The effect operates somewhat automatically; conscious correction helps but doesn’t eliminate the pull.
In negotiation, first offers anchor subsequent discussion. The party who names a number first often gains an advantage — if the anchor is within the realm of plausibility. Extreme anchors can backfire, but even these can shift the zone of acceptable outcomes.
The practical implication: treat first numbers with suspicion — including your own. If you’re estimating, consider starting from a different base. If you’re negotiating, be thoughtful about whether to anchor first. And when you see a number before making a judgment, ask whether the number deserves to influence you. Often it doesn’t, but it will anyway.
Related: cognitive handholds, tacit knowledge, negotiation, second order effects, epistemology