Fundamental Attribution Error
Someone cuts you off in traffic. “What a jerk.” You cut someone off: “I’m late, that intersection is confusing, I didn’t see them.” We explain others’ behavior through their character; we explain our own through circumstances. This asymmetry — overweighting disposition, underweighting situation when judging others — is the fundamental attribution error.
Lee Ross named the pattern. When watching others, we see the person; the environment is backdrop. When experiencing ourselves, we feel the pressures; our character is invisible. The same action gets different interpretations based on perspective. The error isn’t seeing character or context — it’s the asymmetric weighting.
The error has practical consequences. We blame individuals for systemic failures. We assume malice when incentives explain behavior. We hire and fire based on personality judgments when the job context is what really mattered. We underestimate how much situation shapes action.
This doesn’t mean character is irrelevant. The same situation produces different behaviors; individuals vary. But the variance we attribute to character is inflated. Put most people in bad incentive structures and they’ll behave badly. Blame the person; miss the system.
The correction requires mental effort: deliberately considering the situation before concluding about the person. “What pressures might produce this behavior in a reasonable actor?” The answer sometimes exonerates; sometimes it doesn’t. But asking the question reduces the error.
The flip side: when evaluating your own failures, resist purely situational explanations. The same generosity you’d extend to others’ contexts should apply to others’ judgments of you. The truth is usually somewhere between “they’re a bad person” and “anyone would do that.”
Related: systems, incentives, second order effects, preference falsification, epistemology